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ARTICLES
HUMAN NEED AND THE RIGHT OF PATIENTS
TO PRIVACY
Len Doyal*
Few commentators have done more than Ian Kennedy to highlight the
centrality of the concept of autonomy for medical law and ethics. Over
many years and with great flair and unremitting consistency, he has de-
fended the right of competent patients to exercise final control over med-
ical decisions about themselves. Having no truck with attempts to
conflate moral with clinical judgment, he has dramatized the dangers of
paternalism within medicine.' Kennedy has also criticized the conserva-
tism of those judges who are unwilling to challenge professional vested
interests and thereby reinforce such paternalism.'
Yet, despite the value of Kennedy's championship of the moral impor-
tance of autonomy within the patient-clinician relationship, there remains
a puzzling silence within his work. He appears to regard respect for au-
tonomy as a moral given, but gives little justification for this.' Moral in-
tuition, therefore, becomes the only foundation of his ethico-legal
arguments. This is hardly surprising. Much of Kennedy's work is con-
cerned explicitly with medico-legal issues rather than the articulation of
the philosophical foundations for his moral beliefs. However, these foun-
dations are important. Without them, and in the face of conflicts between
* Mr. Doyal is Professor of Medical Ethics, St. Bartholomew's and The Royal
London School of Medicine and Dentistry, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University
of London. Many thanks to Lesley Doyal, Daniel Wilsher, Jenny King, George Rainbolt
and, most importantly, Ian Kennedy for his advice, support, and wonderful sense of hu-
mour over the years.
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clinicians' intuitions about the same moral questions, we risk being
thrown back into the very professional arbitrariness from which Kennedy
has done so much to extricate us.
Nothing better illustrates this problem in medicine than the literature
on privacy. Few doubt the centrality of confidentiality to the success of
the clinical encounter. The principle of confidentiality has been repeat-
edly endorsed by the medical profession throughout its history. At the
same time, however, this emphasis on the privacy of patients has been
qualified consistently whenever it is perceived to be in conflict with other
public interests deemed more important. In the face of such conflict, the
information which passes between clinician and patient can lose its other-
wise privileged status. Indeed, there are some circumstances where clini-
cians are required by law to breach confidentiality.4
Though such breaches of confidence are common practice, we need to
ask whether there is any moral justification for overriding the right of
patients to privacy in this way, and if so, how we should decide when to
apply these justifications. Moral intuition does not suffice since, again,
individuals do not always agree. This paper will clarify these issues by
explaining: why respect for autonomy is a basic human right; why respect
for the confidentiality of the clinical relationship is an extension of this
right; why privacy conceived as a right morally derives from imputed du-
ties of good citizenship; and, why these duties are incompatible with
some, but not all, harms to other recognized citizens. The paper will con-
clude with a brief analysis of some implications of these arguments for
our understanding of relevant law within the United Kingdom and the
United States. Throughout, specific references to law will primarily per-
tain to the former.
I. Is THERE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITHIN THE
CLINICAL RELATIONSHIP?
All regulatory and advisory institutions concerned with professional
standards in medicine generally endorse the principle of confidentiality.
For example, in its guidance to doctors, the General Medical Council
("GMC") in the United Kingdom states: "Patients have a right to expect
that you will not pass on any personal information which you learn in the
course of your professional duties, unless they agree." 5 The British Medi-
4. IAN KENNEDY & ANDREW GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW: TEXT WITH MATERIALS 644-71
(1994).
5. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, Confidentiality 2 (London: GMC, 1995).
Human Need and the Right of Patients to Privacy
cal Association concurs: "Privacy is a fundamental right which allows in-
dividuals to decide the manner and extent to which information about
themselves is shared with others."6 The American Medical Association
confirms the same moral principle: "physicians shall respect the rights of
patients... and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints
of the law," as do other professional organizations whose members are
involved in clinical work.7
Legally, the source of the obligation of clinicians to maintain confiden-
tiality is less clear in Britain than the United States, although there is no
doubt that the duty exists. Unlike the United States, privacy is not a rec-
ognized legal right in Britain.8 Further, since patients under the National
Health Service have no enforceable contract with their clinicians, there is
no related remedy available for breach of confidentiality.9 Section 8 of
The European Convention of Human Rights states that: "Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life his home and correspon-
dence" so that in theory an application can be made to the European
Court of Human Rights.1" However, the Convention makes no explicit
reference to the right to confidentiality as regards clinical care.
Theoretically, a clinician who breaches a patient's confidence may be
deemed negligent since there is a recognized duty of care to maintain
confidentiality. If significant harm results from a breach of confidence,
then a claim for damages may arise. However, the more likely legal rem-
edy in Britain is in equity through an action for breach of confidence per
se.11 The relevant case law involves injunctions to prevent information
from being made public, rather than claims for financial compensation for
harm. There is widespread agreement among commentators in Britain
that in principle, the illegality of a breach of confidentiality should be
6. ETHICS, SCIENCE AND INFORMATION DIVISION, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
MEDICAL ETmics TODAY: ITS PRACTICE AND PHILOSOPHY 36 (London: BMJ Publishing,
1993).
7. Bernard Friedland, Physician-Patient Confidentiality: Time to Re-examine a Vener-
able Concept in Light of Contemporary Society and Advances in Medicine, 15 J. LEGAL
MED. 249, 256-57 (1994) (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF ME-
DIAL ETHICs IV (rev. ed. 1981)).
8. RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM 1-20 (London: Blackstone,
1995).
9. JONATHAN MONTGOMERY, HEALTH CARE LAW 250-54 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1997).
10. JEAN MCHALE ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 439
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) (citing section eight European Convention of Human
Rights).
11. MONTGOMERY, supra note 9, at 250-53.
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understood in these terms. In practice, however, because of legal difficul-
ties pertaining to the calculation of damages and the costs of litigation,
the most easily available remedy for patients remains professional rather
than legal censure.12
Philosophical justifications for the moral importance of clinical confi-
dentiality usually fall into two categories. First, as regards the patient-
clinician relationship, it is argued that the aggregate utilitarian conse-
quences of breaching confidentiality otherwise outweigh the benefits, un-
derstanding "benefit" to be some subjective measure of utility (e.g.,
happiness, preference, desire). The success of the clinical relationship
will depend on trust: the willingness of patients. to respond honestly to
any questions pertaining to their diagnosis and treatment and to follow
prescribed treatment plans. High benefits in utilitarian terms will not ac-
crue if the trust of patients is compromised by fear that an embarrassing
breach of confidence may occur.
13
Despite the fact that professional lip service is sometimes paid to such
utilitarian justifications, they face serious difficulties. On the one hand, it
is unclear how the relative subjective benefits of maintaining confidential-
ity are supposed to be measured. For example, different individuals re-
spond to embarrassment in a range of ways: which ones should we select
as our standard measure? This dilemma goes to the heart of the problem
faced by judges in determining financial awards for damages pertaining to
a breach of confidence. On the other hand, the aggregate pleasure de-
rived from, or preference expressed for, revealing confidential informa-
tion about a patient-a well known celebrity, for example-might far
exceed any discomfort caused to the patient. Yet, professional and regu-
latory codes do not allow utilitarian calculation of this kind. Therefore, it
is implicit in such codes that much more is required to justify a breach of
confidentiality than high levels of aggregate pleasure or preference.
Rather, accepted codes endorse the view that there is something intrinsi-
cally wrong about such breaches.
This endorsement derives from the second justification customarily
used for protecting confidentiality: the belief that patients have the moral
right to the protection of their privacy. As we have seen, such codes
make explicit reference to rights in which individuals are believed to have
claims on others who must or should honor them, with the former's rights
12. MARGARET BRAZIER, MEDICINE, PATIENTS AND THE LAW 48 (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1992).
13. TOM L. BEACHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
421-24 (4th ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Human Need and the Right of Patients to Privacy
always trumping the preferences of the latter's.'4 If we believe in one's
strict right to confidentiality in these terms, it follows that others should
be denied access to the medical secrets of patients, without their consent.
However, accepting that rights trump preferences brings us no closer to
explaining why the confidentiality of patients should be taken'so seriously
in this way.
In an interesting commentary on medical confidentiality and legal prac-
tice, Jean McHale explicitly links the right of the patient to confidentiality
to that of the citizen to privacy: "The right to privacy relates to the right
of the individual to control access to his own personal information...
[and] ... applies to all personal information .... It is confidential infor-
mation which is especially worthy of protection."' 5 Quite so, and Ken-
nedy certainly agrees.' 6 But again, one asks, why? McHale rightly
endorses the views of a number of philosophers who have emphasized the
importance of privacy for the development and expression of individual
autonomy. 7 Yet, like Kennedy, she provides no moral justification for so
doing. Instead, she refers to her "declared... preferred alternative" to
do so. 8 No clear guide is provided as to what should be argued if others
have different preferences.
We require a more coherent moral.justification for taking the general
right to privacy seriously, as well as the specific right of patients to the
confidentiality of their communication with clinicians. Without it, there
seems little to choose between the intuitions and preferences of its de-
fenders and those (e.g., some journalists) who would justify their opposite
position in similar terms.
II. HUMAN NEED AND THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY
Why do we regard privacy itself as so important? Returning to moral
intuition, privacy certainly does feel as if it should ordinarily be re-
spected; that it is of intrinsic moral importance. One way of synthesizing
the many arguments which have been put forward in support of this posi-
tion is to determine the extent to which privacy can be said to be a human
14. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIorrs SERIOUSLY, at v-xv (London: Duckworth,
1981).
15. JEAN V. McHALE, MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE 56
(London: Routledge, 1994).
16. Ian Kennedy, The Doctor, the Pill and the Fifteen Year Old Girl, in TREAT ME
RIGHT, ESSAYS IN MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 52-118 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
17. McHALE, supra note 15, at 54-56.
18. Id. at 69.
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need, like nutrition, as opposed to. a preference or desire, like hamburg-
ers. If human needs are themselves of moral significance, then the same
will apply to privacy and to clinical confidentiality if they can also be
shown to be needs.
What are basic human needs? To answer this question, we must first
ask another: is there anything that all humans in all cultures have an ob-
jective interest in achieving, irrespective of any other cultural differences?
The answer is that all have' an interest in attaining the capacity for poten-
tially successful social participation. Such participation is crucial.
Through it we develop our manual and mental skills, i.e., the specific abil-
ities and associated social roles which constitute the means by which we
identify ourselves and others as individuals. Our potential to flourish as
humans will depend on the evolution and sustained reinforcement of
these abilities and roles. If our potential for successful social participa-
tion is artificially reduced, we will be disabled both as the persons we now
are and the persons we may wish to become. We will be objectively
harmed, irrespective of our culture.' 9
Universal and objective basic human needs can, therefore, be defined
as those general abilities that individuals must acquire if they are not to
be so harmed. The capacity for successful social participation is propor-
tional in individuals to the degree of satisfaction of two variables: physical
survival/health and autonomy. The ways in which death and sustained
physical illness can disable social participation are clear. Individual au-
tonomy can be placed in the same category, if by "autonomy" we mean
the degree to which individuals possess enough understanding, emotional
confidence, and social opportunity to formulate aims and beliefs, which
they then employ to interact with others. If they possess only low levels
of these attributes, and thereby low levels of autonomy, then as is the
case with poor physical health, their ability to flourish within their culture
will be fundamentally disabled.2"
This argument linking basic human needs to survival/physical health
and autonomy is highly abstract, producing what is sometimes called a
"thin" theory of need.2 To make our theory more substantial
("thicker"), it must be linked empirically to the further concrete needs
which must always be satisfied if survival/physical health and autonomy
19. LEN DOYAL & IAN GOUGH, A THEORY OF HUMAN NEED 49-75 (London: Mac-
millan, 1991).
20. Id.
21. Kate Soper, The Thick and Thin of Human Needing, in NEW APPROACHES TO
WELFARE THEORY 69-84 (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, G. Drover & P. Kerans eds., 1993).
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are to be achieved. Let us think of these "intermediate needs" as those
properties of goods, services, activities, and relationships that enhance
physical health and human autonomy in all cultures. Elsewhere, Ian
Gough and this author have argued that there are eleven such intermedi-
ate needs: nutritional food and clean water, protective clothing, a non-
hazardous work environment, a non-hazardous physical environment, ap-
propriate health care, security in childhood, significant primary relation-
ships, physical security, economic security, appropriate education, and
safe birth control and child-bearing.22
Aside from safe birth control and childbearing, which are of course
sex-specific, these intermediate needs are universal in that they must be
met for individuals everywhere-if their potential for successful social
participation and human flourishing is to be optimized. Safe birth control
and childbearing are needs in the same sense for one-half of the world's
population. However, there is no cultural monopoly on how such inter-
mediate needs should be satisfied.
Having now defined intermediate needs, one can show that privacy
should also be regarded as a need in this sense. It is another universal
characteristic, the satisfaction of which is especially important in the fos-
tering of individual autonomy, in the same way in which, say, appropriate
education can be said to be. The link between privacy and control over
access of information already has been mentioned; now, the definition is
broadened. Privacy includes individual control over access to certain ac-
tivities, especially those deemed personal or intimate, and to information
associated with such activities.23
This definition captures much of what we ordinarily refer to as privacy.
For example, it sums up the concern that patients have for the privacy of
the clinical consultation, that diarists have for the privacy of their jour-
nals, that lovers have for the privacy of their bedroom, that people in
business have for the privacy of their contractual negotiations, and that
we all have for the privacy of our weird and wonderful fantasies. There is
a clear link between such examples of privacy and the understanding,
emotional confidence, and social opportunities required-the autonomy
required-to interact with others in ways which we and they deem suc-
cessful. Each of these is taken in turn.
Privacy is an essential element in realizing the potential of individuals
22. DOYAL & GOUGH, supra note 19, at 155-59.
23. Julie Inness, Information, Access, or Intimate Decisions About One's Actions? The
Content of Privacy, 5 PUB. AFF. Q. 227-42 (1991).
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for successful social participation. Without it, they cannot learn the rele-
vant cognitive and emotional skills, nor be initiated into the nuances of
the different rules, which constitute the normative and legal fabric of
their social lives. Privacy is important for this process because the acqui-
sition of understanding-education in the broadest sense-requires the
ability to make mistakes without censure, the opportunity to practice
without embarrassment.
2 4
When we move on to emotional confidence, the role of privacy, and the
supportive relationships of intimacy making it possible, become even
clearer. It is through significant primary relationships that we seek sup-
port for our weaknesses and failures, as well as celebrations of whatever
successes we achieve. Within these relationships, we can explore, de-
velop, and improve those emotional aspects of our personalities that if
displayed publicly might undermine our potential for successful social in-
teraction in the future." When such intimacy is lacking, especially in
childhood, the result can be emotional disability. Equally, when impor-
tant intimate relations are lost, along with the particular types of privacy
that they offered, disabling depression can often follow.2 6 .
Social opportunity is the third determinant of the level of autonomy
which individuals display in social participation. It has both positive and
negative dimensions, corresponding to what has been described as posi-
tive and negative freedom. 27 The former entails freedom from interfer-
ence by others; the latter freedom to act on the basis of personal beliefs
and goals and the practical resources to do so. Our social opportunity for
autonomous action will obviously be constrained in ways that are person-
ally damaging if others, including government, do not respect our privacy
as a form of degative freedom.28 Positive freedom, on the other hand,
requires specific goods and services without which specific goals cannot
be pursued. For example, we may be left alone to further our education
in our own way, and this is morally important. Yet more education will
only be a practical possibility if we have the resources to obtain it.
The same point applies to privacy as a form of positive freedom. When
24. Jeffery Johnson, A Theory of the Nature and Value of Privacy, 6 PUB. AFF. Q. 271-
88 (1992).
25. See Charles Fried, Privacy: A Moral Analysis, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY 203-22 (New York: Cambridge University Press, F. D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
26. GEORGE W. BROWN & TIRRIL HARRIS, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DEPRESSION 173-79
(London: Tavistock Press, 1978).
27. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1969).
28. Jeffery Johnson, Privacy, Liberty and Integrity, 3 PUB. AFF. Q. 15-33 (1989).
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we think positively about the importance of personal control over access
to certain types of information and other aspects of personal activity, it is
almost always with reference to the things that we have an interest in
doing in private. Yet the degree to which we are in a position to enjoy
and benefit from our privacy will usually depend on much more than sim-
ply being left alone. For example, elderly people without surviving rela-
tives, financial resources, and decent housing may have a great deal of
privacy in that no one cares to intrude in their personal lives. However,
this is simply another way of saying that they may be alone and lonely.
Thus, there is nothing valuable about privacy in itself unless the individu-
als concerned have something they want to do in private as well as the
practical means to achieve it. This in turn will depend on the degree to
which intermediate needs other than privacy have been satisfied (e.g., ba-
sic education, and physical and economic security).
It follows that a reciprocal relationship exists between the levels of au-
tonomy that an individual possesses and the degree to which her interme-
diate need for privacy has been satisfied. Although our autonomy is
enhanced by the degree of privacy in our lives, the amount of privacy we
command, and the impact which it has on the quality of our lives, de-
pends on the autonomy which we bring to enjoying that privacy. In short,
the more autonomy we exercise in our lives, the more we will benefit
from privacy, and the more we benefit from privacy, the more autonomy
we will possess.
This close link between autonomy and privacy explains why breaches
of privacy are about much more than just intrusion, embarrassment, un-
wanted publicity, or loss of earnings, which in law are damages associated
with violations of privacy." Even if no harm can be demonstrated in any
of these respects, an individual's potential for successful social participa-
tion can still be damaged if privacy is abused For example, sustained
breaches of privacy may undermine confidence and lead to abnormal
levels of anxiety and depression. Hence, the significance of the disabled
social participation resulting from loss of privacy cannot for many aspects
of an individual's life be captured by or reduced to the harms associated
with the usual legal remedies.3°
Further, if someone records and makes public a particularly intimate
29. William Prosser, PRIVACY [A LEGAL ANALYSIS], in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY 107 (New York: Cambridge University Press, F. D. Shoeman ed., 1984).
30. See Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 156-202 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, F. D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
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moment between two individuals, one may not be subject to immediate
ridicule or be financially disadvantaged. Indeed, one's friends and the
public may gather round in support and one's popularity may even in-
crease. However, it is impossible to predict how events such as these may
affect one's social participation if they are revealed at some later date.
There is no way of guaranteeing that one's autonomy will not be re-
stricted by others in ways about which one is unaware and in which one
has a significant interest.
Breach of privacy should, therefore, be regarded as constituting a harm
in itself for which legal remedy should be available.31 Conceptualizing
privacy as an intermediate need which must be satisfied for the basic need
for autonomy to be satisfied helps to make this clear. If we morally value
autonomy because of its role in enabling individuals to avoid harm
throughout their lives, then we must do the same for privacy to the de-
gree that it enables them to develop and sustain that autonomy.
Finally, arguments demonstrating the importance of privacy for human
flourishing also explain its particular significance for relationships be-
tween patients and their clinicians. We have noted that the success of
these relations depends on the willingness of patients for clinicians to
touch them, and to discuss the details of their symptoms and their per-
sonal lives, in ways that would not normally be allowed except with an
intimate partner. Equally, in learning to cope with suspected or real ill-
ness, patients also require a setting where they can unburden their anxie-
ties, fears, and fantasies without the fear of public exposure. The belief
by patients that their privacy will be protected, that they will remain in
control of any information thus communicated to their clinicians, op-
timises the opportunity for such self-reflection and enhances autonomy in
the face of illness and medical treatment. Patients and clinicians may not
be friends, and should not be lovers. As regards privacy, however, the
normative structure of their relationship is much the same.
III. PRIVACY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
One may accept the argument that privacy is an intermediate need es-
sential to the achievement of requisite levels of autonomy. Yet, that does
not explain why individuals have a general right to privacy and a specific
right to confidentiality within the clinical relationship. As any of the forty
million American citizens with inadequate access to health care will con-
firm, the recognition of a need does not entail that everyone will agree on
31. MONTGOMERY, supra note 9, at 252.
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the right to its satisfaction. 32 Indeed, some well known moral philoso-
phers argue that no individual or government should be able to force
others to be charitable, even in the face of the most extreme need.3 3 Why
should the situation be any different in relation to the recognition of pri-
vacy as a human need?
We have outlined why some utilitarian arguments do not provide a sat-
isfactory answer. There may be circumstances when breaches of privacy
may well create more rather than less subjective utility. The fact that we
reject at least some of these as morally inappropriate suggests that we
must look elsewhere for an explanation of why we should regard privacy
and clinical confidentiality as constituting claims which all humans are
entitled to make on others. The same point applies to attempts to ground
the right to clinical confidentiality on moral intuition. Like calculations of
utility, these too may conflict. Can the gulf between the need for privacy
and the right to it be bridged in some other way?
Consider the following argument. Cultures are bound together by vi-
sions of "the good" which are equated with a variety of moral duties. It is
our conformity with specific sets of such duties which identifies us as
good citizens of particular cultures. Depending on the cultural impor-
tance of the particular duties linked to the type of "goodness" in ques-
tion, conformity will be reinforced by legal and/or moral censure. For
example, all cultures have moral codes concerning the responsibilities
that parents or those with parental responsibilities have for the informal
or formal education of children in their charge. Parents or guardians are
expected to do their best to conform to these codes, and penalties will be
enforced if they do not carry out their duties.
Yet to say that someone "ought" to do something implies that they
"can" do it. If we believe that others should do their best to do what is
right, to be a good citizen in terms of the duties believed to define mem-
bership of our culture, then it follows that they must have the physical
and mental abilities and the social opportunities to do so. This point ap-
plies equally to our moral expectations of ourselves and of others to us.
We cannot realize our potential as good citizens if we are physically and
mentally disabled in ways that are potentially correctable, but are not
corrected. This is true of all cultures, regardless of whether or not they
32. Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Jan. 13, 1994, at 20.
33. RAYMOND PLANT ET AL., POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(London: Routledge, 1980).
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employ the specific concept of "citizenship," and of all individuals who
morally identify with them.
It follows that if we wish to impute moral duties on others, then we
must accept that others have a right to the appropriate need satisfaction
required to enable them to do their best to do their duty, to be the good
citizens we wish them to be. To ask less of them would imply that we are
not serious about our moral beliefs regarding good citizenship. The same
applies to the expectations of others as regards us. If they wish us to
carry out those duties which they morally endorse to the best of our abil-
ity, then they must respect our right to the need satisfaction this requires.
In either case, optimal levels of good citizenship will only be achieved if
citizens themselves are helped to achieve optimal levels of physical health
and autonomy, our two basic human needs. Returning to our earlier ex-
ample, if we really do believe that parents have a moral responsibility for
the education of their children, we also have a duty to help them to ac-
quire the necessary intermediate need satisfaction to enable them to do
so, including the intermediate need of privacy for the reasons already
outlined.
The same argument can be made with respect to the privacy of pa-
tients. If the therapeutic enterprise is to work, patients themselves must
do their best to cooperate with the diagnostic process and to follow treat-
ment plans when they are appropriately prescribed.34 But unless they
believe that they will have control over potentially embarrassing informa-
tion about themselves, they are unlikely to fulfill these obligations, since
they will not trust their clinicians sufficiently to do so. Indeed, they may
even endanger their own health and that of others by not seeking help in
the future. Hence, if clinicians wish their patients to be mature and re-
sponsible citizens, they should respect their right to privacy, i.e., their
confidentiality. Any alternative picture lacks consistency.
Thus, it is philosophical reasoning about the relationship between
needs, rights, and duties that ultimately dictates the moral importance of
the patients' right to confidentiality, not the calculation 'of utility or the
exercise of moral intuition.
IV. PRIVACY AND CLINICAL CONFIDENTIALITY AS QUALIFIED RIGHTS
At this point, however, both utilitarians and moral intuitionists may
object. On the face of it, the argument linking expectations of good citi-
34. Donald A. Redeimeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive and
Emotional Perspectives, 271 JAMA 72-76 (1993).
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zenship to the right to high levels of basic need satisfaction is universal in
character. Yet this does not seem to apply to privacy, especially with re-
spect to the confidentiality of the clinical relationship. It is widely ac-
cepted that there are extraordinary circumstances where the right to
confidentiality should be professionally and legally qualified.35 In one
way or another, these qualifications concern conflicts between the inter-
ests of the patient and other individuals, or the general public.
In the context of professional ethics in the United Kingdom, the GMC
states that "[d]isclosures may be necessary in the public interest ....
Similarly, legal provisions exist for acceptable breaches of confidence in
the case of information about notifiable diseases, dangerous drivers, or
suspected terrorists.37 Arguments about the public interest are also in the
background of disclosures ordered by a court, in relation to attempts to
detect or to prevent crime, or to facilitate the fairness of the judicial pro-
cess.38 Thus, breaches, of clinical confidentiality are professionally and
legally regarded as acceptable when the right of patients to exercise con-
trol over information about their diagnosis and treatment might lead to
the significant harm of others. How can such exceptions to the principle
of respect for privacy be morally justified?
Utilitarians will regard such conflicts as confirmation of the necessity of
linking moral judgement to the maximization of aggregate subjective util-
ity, e.g., if more happiness will be generated through ignoring confidenti-
ality in the public interest, then so be it. For utilitarians, rights are at best
a fiction which people should be encouraged to believe because of the
beneficial consequences of doing so. If the benefits concerning aggregate
happiness of doing otherwise-outweigh the deficits, then there can be no
moral reason for respecting rights. With regard to medicine, such argu-
ments might appear to have exerted much influence. Professional codes
of ethics concerning confidentiality regularly justify breaches of confi-
dence in circumstances identified with the public interest. Important re-
cent cases in English law do the same, reiterating the view that since
patients have no legal right to privacy, their entitlements, such as they
are, derive primarily from the public interest inherent in sick individuals
submitting themselves for treatment.39
Whether or not these arguments should be viewed as utilitarian, how-
35. McHALE, supra note 15, at 71-98.
36. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 8.
37. KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 644-71.
38. McHALE, supra note 15, at 57-70.
39. W v. Egdell, 1 All ER 835, 847-49 (1990).
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ever, depends upon how one defines the public interest. If breaches of
confidence are defended with reference to increases in aggregate happi-
ness or preference, then this reasoning will certainly qualify as utilitarian.
However, we have already seen that utilitarianism is flawed by the lack of
any objective measure for comparing subjective utility. The majority of
the public may well be made happier than would otherwise be the case if
private information about specific patients is revealed to them. However,
the medical profession and the courts reject the legitimacy of disclosure
on the grounds of promoting greater subjective utility. The only basis for
their rejection must, therefore, be an objective rather than subjective def-
inition of harm, one linked to conceptions of disability similar to those
which we have identified with the non-satisfaction of the basic needs for
survival/physical health and autonomy.
The implementation of such an objective measure might lead to the
non-utilitarian consequence of the preferences of the majority being dis-
counted. It follows, for example, that despite frequent claims to the con-
trary, the public has no professional or legal right to information about
the HIV status of clinicians simply because they are seropositive. The
risks of objective harm to members of the public through not being told
of their doctors' status are deemed to be less than those of infected clini-
cians whose confidentiality is breached, however strongly and widespread
feelings may be to the contrary.40
Similar arguments can be applied to the belief that moral judgements
about the boundaries of clinical confidentiality should be decided on the
basis of moral intuition. Some clinicians, for example, are intuitively con-
vinced that patients should be tested for HIV in order to protect health
care teams who treat them. Others intuitively oppose this view.4 1
But haven't we now reached a dead-end? Approaches to understand-
ing the importance of confidentiality, which are not rights-based, lack co-
herence. Yet we seem no closer to providing an account of how the right
to privacy can be reconciled with the obvious need to protect the public
from objective harm. Indeed, McHale is skeptical of any successful philo-
sophical resolution to this tension, claiming instead that: "Ethical analysis
assists us to identify questions of concern. But philosophy provides us
with the tools for reasoning and not with the answers to the questions of
40. Len Doyal, Good Ethical Practice in the Dental Treatment of Patients with HIVI
AIDS, in ORAL DISEASES 3, Suppl 1:214-20 (1997).
41. Ronald Bayer, AIDS, Public Health and Civil Liberties, in AIDS AND ETHIcs 26-
49 (New York: Columbia University Press, F. G. Reamer ed., 1991).
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practical importance which assail us. It is for us to make the choice."42 If
we leave it at that, however, there can be no more incentive to recom-
mend McHale's choice of moral options than anyone else's. Moral issues
become matters for a vote (back to utilitarianism) or the application of
power. Both are dangerous positions in a decade when we have seen
majorities engage in genocide against minorities. Can philosophy offer a
better alternative?
V. THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
We have seen that the moral right to privacy goes hand-in-hand with
reciprocal expectations of good citizenship. However, the existence of
this right does not entail its unlimited application. The right to privacy
follows not from the fact that it is an intermediate human need, but from
the fact that individuals will not be as able to live up to the moral expec-
tations of others unless their privacy is respected. We cannot, therefore,
defend the privacy right while simultaneously inflicting objective harm on
others. For it is precisely the avoidance of this disabling kind of harm
that provides the moral justification for taking the right to privacy
seriously.
To allow others to be harmed through respect for my right to privacy
would be inconsistent with my presumed commitment to the universality
of my own moral values about their obligations, including their obliga-
tions not to harm me. For they would not be able to live up to those
values and responsibilities as well as they otherwise might. It is true that
were they harmed by me, they might not be as able to harm me-depend-
ing on the type of harm I inflict. However, it will equally be the case that
they will also be unable positively to achieve any of the other moral goals
which I associate with their and my good citizenship. The same applies to
their harming me in the exercise of their right to privacy. My ability to
continue to do my duty in their moral terms would also suffer as a result.
Therefore, respect for privacy and the potential for moral worthiness go
hand-in-hand so long as such respect does not undermine this potential
through the generation of other types of objective harm.
For this reason, respect for the rights of patients stops at the point that
it poses a threat to the survival/physical health of others. Reason, not
utilitarian calculation, dictates that if a patient insists that his privacy is to
be respected in the face of such a threat, he is ignoring the right of others
not to be harmed. In the name of expediency, he is rejecting the possibil-
42. McHALE, supra note 15, at 70.
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ity of others doing what he professes to believe to be right, as well as they
might. He contradicts himself and in the process effectively rejects
whatever moral beliefs to which he may otherwise have expressed a com-
mitment. If we really believe in the moral correctness of specific goals
then consistency dictates that we want others to be able to do their best to
achieve them. Otherwise, we cannot believe that what we endorse as
moral goodness is that good after all!
VI. OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ARGUMENTS
I have argued that privacy inside and outside medicine is a basic human
right. It follows that the law in the United Kingdom should move in the
direction of that in the United States. That is, it should be modified to
provide specific remedies for failures to respect this right. These changes
should recognize that it is the intrusion of privacy itself that harms the
individual rather than any embarrassment or financial loss associated
with it. As with battery, it is the breach of the individual's autonomy per
se which may constitute the only harm for which legal remedy is sought.43
In the context of medicine, this means that in the absence of convincing
evidence that respect for clinical confidentiality poses a threat to others,
any breach of that respect should be actionable as a violation of privacy
per se.44 If an action were successfully brought on these grounds, then
exemplary damages should be awarded since clinicians have a special re-
sponsibility in this connection. Likewise, information gained from pa-
tients during a clinical consultation should be considered legally
privileged. Clinicians should be asked to reveal this information only
when serious harm is posed to others. Such harm would include any un-
fairness that might result in legal proceedings if disclosure were refused.
It is doubtful whether legal innovation to achieve these aims will come
from within Britain or through the jurisdiction of the European courts.
It follows from arguments developed herein that the risk of serious
harm to others may indeed trump the rights of individuals to privacy.
However, it does not follow that the risks of objective harm to patients
themselves will trump their right to respect from others. The right to
privacy derives from its status as one of the intermediate needs; it must be
satisfied to meet the basic need for autonomy. The priority of autonomy
over privacy in this sense will be forgotten if the confidentiality of pa-
43. Roger Crisp, Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent and Autonomy, 17
J.L. & Soc'y, 79-81 (1990).
44. MCHALE, supra note 15, at 109.
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tients is sacrificed in order to protect them, as opposed to others, from
harm.
The GMC says the following about competent patients:
Rarely you may judge that seeking consent to the disclosure of
confidential information would be damaging to the patient, but
that the disclosure would be in the patient's best interests. For
example, you may judge that it would be in a patient's interests
that a close relative should know about the patient's terminal
condition, but that the patient would be seriously harmed by the
information. In such circumstances information may be dis-
closed without consent.45
The history of medicine is littered with potentially damaging paternalism
of this kind. Regulatory bodies should dissuade clinicians from breaching
their patients' trust, rather than encouraging them to violate the principle
of clinical confidentiality whenever they deem it appropriate. Surely, it is
better to suggest that clinicians develop the communication skills neces-
sary to communicate bad news with a minimum of distress both to pa-
tients and themselves, while also remembering that sorrow is a natural
and rational response to bad news. Because the statement by the GMC
quoted above is inconsistent with the right to privacy, it can be regarded
as an invitation to harm patients rather than to act in their best interests.
If, for example, patients are deceived in the way the GMC suggests, they
may be made unable to interact with others toward the end of their lives
in ways that they may have otherwise wished. The GMC statement con-
flates clinical and moral judgment in precisely the ways that Ian Kennedy
has so classically and powerfully argued against.46
One must, however, be cautious in defence of the moral importance of
the confidentiality of the patient-clinician relationship. Appeals to regard
privacy as a fundamental human right will ring hollow to those who lack
the intellectual, emotional, social, or material wherewithal to demand
rights claims of any real significance in their lives. This injury would be
compounded if, in the name of respecting the right of privacy, we turn
our backs on violations of other human rights occurring in circumstances
inappropriately regarded as private by others. If one's right to privacy
stops when it threatens seriously to harm others, the "others" in question
consist of everyone who might be negatively affected, including family
members, friends and anyone else with whom one may be regarded as
having a private relationship.
45. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 6.
46. See Kennedy, supra note 1.
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Some commentators have rightly condemned the way in which moral
arguments for privacy have been used to justify non-intervention by the
state to protect women from their violent husbands.47 The phrase "a
man's home is his castle" sums up the problem and the refusal of some
police to deal adequately with domestic violence because it is a "private
affair" provides a clear illustration. However, the moral right to privacy
is linked to, and circumscribed by, the basic needs of each individual,
rather than the collective interests of the family. It has been argued that
respect for privacy loses its moral force when it leads to the objective
harm of others. Hence a proper formulation of the privacy right cannot
lead to the legitimation of the abuse of women in the name of protecting
the family. Indeed, it is unclear what critics of the right to privacy would
put in its place in order to protect the very individuals they wish to de-
fend.48 The fact that a moral concept can be abused does not necessitate
such abuse.
It also follows from the arguments outlined herein that individuals
should be prevented from harming others through the exercise of their
ordinary right to privacy. And, when prevention fails, punishment must
be imposed. For such legal constraints to have effect, it is crucial for the
state to be seen to have a legitimate role in limiting personal privacy in
situations where others are placed at risk. The practical problems of de-
ciding where to draw the boundaries of such state intervention and how
to control abuses of state authority are important considerations. But
such concerns must not obscure the state's right to intervene when
necessary.
Thus far, nothing has been said about two especially contentious areas
of the law relating to privacy: abortion and the right of patients to control
the circumstances of their own death. In the United States, the legal right
to abortion in Roe v. Wade was based on the constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 49 It follows from the general arguments herein, that this is a poor
defence and if is one which has also been attacked by other commenta-
tors.5" Once it is recognized that the state does have a legitimate interest
in violating the privacy of some in order to protect the lives and health of
47. Nancy S. Jecker, Privacy Beliefs and the Violent Family: Extending the Ethical Ar-
gument for Physician Intervention, 269 JAMA 777 (1993).
48. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND Soc'y 635-58 (1983).
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. Thomas Halper, Privacy and Autonomy: From Warren and Brandeis to Roe and
Cruzan, 21 J. OF MED. AND PHIL. 121-35 (1996).
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others, then the right to abortion is not guaranteed. Like it or not, many
people believe that, morally, abortion precisely constitutes an attack on
the life and the right to life of the fetus.
The fact that the legal right to abortion has been conceptualized as one
guaranteed by privacy has in fact aided the success of the anti-abortion
lobby. It would have been much more difficult for those who oppose a
woman's right to choose if Roe v. Wade had given abortion the status of a
right linked to the intermediate need for reproductive choice itself,51
which along with privacy, is a necessary condition for meeting the basic
need of autonomy.52 The importance of reproductive freedom as such
would then have become the primary justification behind this and other
related legal judgments.
Legal reasoning should evolve so that denial of access to abortion for
women is focused directly on the objective harm which would accrue to
them should their right to choose be denied. The moral issue at stake
would no longer entail a comparison of the rights of women with those of
their fetus. In the United Kingdom, the legal justification for a woman's
right to choose abortion reflects such reasoning and rejects any grounding
in privacy.53 It should continue to do so, despite other arguments ad-
vanced in general support of the legal right to privacy. The future evolu-
tion of law in the United States should follow suit.
Similar arguments apply to the claim that the right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatments is legally grounded in the right to privacy, either di-
rectly or indirectly through living wills or through the substituted
judgements of legal proxies. There can be no more dramatic nor direct
exercise of individual autonomy than the attempt to determine the cir-
cumstances of one's own death. Privacy is, again, an intermediate need
whose satisfaction derives its moral legitimacy from its relationship to the
satisfaction of the basic need of individual autonomy. Therefore,
whatever "right to die" we have should be directly linked to the exercise
of our own autonomy, rather than our right to privacy as a proxy for
autonomy. 54 There is, of course, a reciprocal relationship between auton-
omy and privacy that we have already outlined: the former is strength-
51. PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 85-90 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996).
52. Id.
53. J. K. MASON & R. A. MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 98-116
(London: Butterworths, 1994).
54. Halper, supra note 50.
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ened by the latter and vice versa. However, this does not mean that they
should be treated as indistinguishable.
As regards competent persons, their "right to die" should be under-
stood as an extension of the right to exercise autonomy in making an
informed choice about which medical treatments are or are not adminis-
tered to preserve life. It is the exercise of control over specific circum-
stances of their administration-who is present, who knows, who knows
what-that should be identified with claims of privacy. Respect for the
autonomy and the privacy of incompetent individuals who, while compe-
tent, expressed a legally binding choice about their treatment (leaving
open what this might mean in practice) should be thought of in the same
terms.
Decisions about the non-provision or withdrawal of treatment of per-
manently incompetent individuals who have not expressed such a choice
clearly cannot be based on the right to privacy or autonomy. They will
never be able to make claims associated with rights of either kind. The
problem then becomes when it can justifiably be argued in law that the
person involved no longer has any interest in life and that to maintain it
artificially would be both cruel and disrespectful. There are no simple
answers and the argument will continue (as it will about abortion), espe-
cially against the background of the duty of the state to keep citizens
from harm.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to explain the moral importance of the confidenti-
ality of the clinical relationship by linking it to the basic need for auton-
omy and the intermediate need for privacy. The moral claim patients
make that their confidentiality should be respected flows from the gen-
eral obligation of others to help them to satisfy their need for both. Un-
less this is done, the capacity of patients to conform to patterns of good
citizenship-as patients-which are expected of others, will be
compromised.
The moral boundaries of the right to privacy, including clinical confi-
dentiality, have also been drawn through the same pattern of reasoning.
Inside or outside of the clinical relationship, the exercise of this right has
been shown to be incompatible with causing harm to others, because to
do so is inconsistent with the very same arguments which give rise to the
55. Carl E. Schneider, Cruzan and the Constitutionalization of American Life, 17 J. OF
MED. AND PHIL., 589-604 (1992).
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right to privacy itself. As a result of these arguments, certain changes in
law within the United Kingdom and in the professional advice currently
offered to British doctors by the GMC are necessary. These arguments
also have implications regarding some aspects of law in the United States.
Throughout, the discussion has attempted to convey the degree to
which patients can be harmed by breaches of their confidence. It is just
as important for doctors to respect the autonomy of their patients as it is
for them to protect their life and health. This sentiment should be philo-
sophically grounded on reason and not utilitarian calculation or moral
intuition. In doing so, such arguments are consistent with and reinforce
much of Ian Kennedy's own work.

